


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# Mobilization of Manpower and Materiel in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries (U)

SEPTEMBER 1982

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DIA review completed.

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# **MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER AND MATERIEL IN THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES (U)**



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### PREFACE

(U) This study examines the role of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) military commissariats in the overall process of force generation. To this end, attention is focused on such key commissariat functions as manning the active forces through conscription, improving the quality of a large reserve pool through training, and mobilizing both the manpower of that pool as well as transport assets from the civilian economy in the event of war. Because of their strategic importance, the study concentrates in particular on commissariats in Pact countries in the NATO Guidelines Area.

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(U) Each classified title and heading in this study has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

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## SUMMARY

(C) As in the USSR, military commissariats in NSWP countries play a crucial role in the system of force generation. Commissariats have no counterpart in the US. Their activities, in fact, combine those of American draft boards, Armed Forces Reserve Centers, and the Veterans Administration. The primary mission of the commissariats in peacetime is conscription and the training of reservists and youths. Their mission in wartime is the mobilization of reservists and transport assets from the civilian economy in accordance with the needs of the NSWP Armed Forces.

(S) Relative to the size and populations of the countries involved, the reserve forces at the command of NSWP commissariats are very substantial. NSWP countries have a total of 7.3 million reservists. This is more than sufficient to raise the NSWP peacetime manning level from 1.3 million to an estimated wartime strength of 2.4 million. Depending on particular circumstances, it would also be more than sufficient to enable NSWP planners to create new formations or replace large losses. Albeit little is known about total NSWP civilian vehicle assets, they also are believed to be sufficient to meet the mobilization requirements of NSWP planners, at least during the initial stages of war.

(S) Although this study is concerned with the system of force generation in the NSWP countries, focus is on those Pact countries in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA), namely, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In a conflict against NATO, it is from these three countries--also referred to as the "Northern Tier"--that the major assault would come and through which enormous numbers of men and quantities of materiel would move. NSWP formations in the NGA would comprise--in terms of divisions--more than half of the first operational echelon of the Western Theater of Military Operations, and the countries themselves would lie across the axis of advance of the second operational echelon. Currently, 52 percent of all NSWP active ground units and 87 percent of Soviet ground units in Eastern Europe are in the NGA. This represents a total of 33 NSWP and 27 Soviet major ground units in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Additionally, these NSWP countries control approximately 62 percent of NSWP active armed forces personnel and nearly 60 percent of NSWP reservists. This represents a total of 812,000 active armed forces personnel and 4.3 million reservists.

(C) Although the role of NSWP commissariats in the system of force generation is very similar to that of commissariats in the Soviet Union, some areas, nevertheless, deserve close attention. In Eastern Europe, for example, and particularly in the Northern Tier countries, response time as a factor in mobilization planning appears to be especially critical. Geography, the proximity to NATO Forces, and the key role NSWP armed forces play in Warsaw Pact contingency plans, account for this. As a result, and to a greater extent than even in the Soviet Union, reserve assignments and motor transport unit missions in the Northern Tier countries (and probably also true for most other NSWP countries) are based on the principle of territoriality. That is, reservists are normally assigned to local units, with motor transport units usually designated to cover only short distances. Moreover, mobilization designation assignments similar to those in the US

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are employed to at least some extent, and, once mobilized, some reservists are even scheduled to be picked up at home by their units. Many reserve officers keep uniforms and some equipment at home and--to accelerate location of unassigned reservists--mobilization notifications are delivered by a variety of means to include the use of postmen, local government officials, commissariat personnel, and radio broadcasts.

(S) The ability of NSWP commissariats, especially those in the Northern Tier, to mobilize men and materiel has been well demonstrated in practice alerts and exercises. This is seen from the data presented in appendixes A and B. Use of computer technology, highly developed telecommunications and lines of communications, and a specialized system for locating unassigned reservists facilitate commissariat efficiency.

(C) In spite of these positive features, however, there are some uncertainties regarding system performance as well. Notably, NSWP systems--like their Soviet counterparts--have never been tested wholly in peacetime, an undertaking prohibited in all but the most threatening of crises by the enormously disruptive nature of general mobilization. In time of war, given the destructiveness of modern weapons, the ability of the commissariats to generate large manpower and material resources and themselves to survive must remain open to question. This is especially true for assets in the Northern Tier which would become high priority NATO targets. Again, with the exception of those with designated mobilization assignments, there is evidence that the training of NSWP reservists is not systematic and that once called up such training is also both perfunctory and haphazard. Consequently, in the event of full mobilization, formations would probably need extensive training prior to commitment if a high level of combat effectiveness was seen as essential or desirable. Finally, a general European war and the attendant threat--or employment--of nuclear strikes could imperil the extent to which NSWP nations would carry out the extensive (and possibly protracted) mobilization of manpower and materiel demanded in Warsaw Pact contingency planning.

(C) In conclusion, it can be stated that the strengths of the NSWP system of force generation are very impressive. However, the system possesses endemic weaknesses as well, which--when coupled with the problems, stresses, and demands of large-scale mobilization and/or massive losses--could gravely affect mobilization performance.

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1. INTRODUCTION

(S) The purpose of this study is to examine the system of force generation of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries. However, because of their strategic locations and the key roles played in Warsaw Pact contingency planning, emphasis throughout the study will focus on those NSWP countries in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA), namely, the Northern Tier states of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In a war against NATO, it is from these three countries that the major assault would come and through which the bulk of men and materiel would be channeled. Currently, 52 percent of all NSWP active ground units and 87 percent of Soviet ground units in Eastern Europe are in the NGA. This represents a total of 33 NSWP and 27 Soviet major ground units, respectively. Additionally, the three countries combined control approximately 62 percent of NSWP active armed forces personnel and nearly 60 percent of NSWP reservists. This represents a force of 812,000 active armed forces personnel and 4.3 million reservists. Tables 1 and 2 show the estimated numbers of NSWP ground units and the disposition of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe. Of the units shown in both charts, all Soviet units and 40 of the 64 NSWP units are designated as Category I by NATO.\*

(C) The system of force generation in NSWP countries closely resembles that of the Soviet Union. Crucial to the process is a military organization responsible in peacetime for, among other things, conscription, training of youths and reservists, and managing the nations's reserve pool. In wartime this organization is responsible for mobilizing reservists and transport assets from the civilian economy. This organization is known in the USSR as a military commissariat. Its counterparts in the NSWP countries are identified in table 3. For purpose of simplicity, however, the term "military commissariat" will be used throughout this study. Also throughout this study, differences between Soviet and NSWP commissariats will be highlighted and similarities synopsized.\*\*

2. SUBORDINATION AND ORGANIZATIONa. Subordination

(C) Like those in the USSR, commissariats in the various NSWP countries are widely dispersed and function under a dual system of command. In all these countries, and as shown in figure 1, the commissariats are ultimately under the operational control of the Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff through the Organization and Mobilization

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\* (C) Category I units have a full complement of combat equipment and are manned at levels between 75 and 100 percent of wartime-authorized strength. Category I units are considered ready for deployment in a few hours.

\*\* (U) See the companion study, Soviet Military Commissariats: Organization and Capabilities (U), DDB-2680-159-82, for a detailed assessment of Soviet commissariats.

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**Table 1**  
**Estimated Number of NSWP Ground Units (U)**

	Mtz Rifle/ Mech	Tank	DIVISIONS				BRIGADES		TOTAL DIVS/BDES
			Assault Landing (Amphib)	Artillery	Airborne	Inf	Tank	Mtn	
Bulgaria	6 <sup>1</sup>	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	11
Czechoslovakia	5	5	—	1	1 <sup>2</sup>	—	—	—	12
Ger. Dem. Rep.	4	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
Hungary	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
Poland	8	5	1	—	1	—	—	—	15
Romania	8	2	—	—	1 <sup>2</sup>	—	—	3	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>64</b>

<sup>1</sup> Includes one training MRD.  
<sup>2</sup> Denotes airborne regiment.

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**Table 2**  
**Disposition of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe (U)**

COUNTRY	MRD	TD	ARTILLERY DIVISIONS	TOTAL LINE
East Germany (GSFG)	10	9	1	20
Poland (NGF)	—	2	—	2
Czechoslovakia (CGF)	3	2	—	5
Hungary (SGF)	2	2	—	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>31</b>

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**Table 3**  
**Designation of NSWP Commissariats (U)**


COUNTRY	TERM	ENGLISH EQUIVALENT
Poland	Sztab Wojskowy	Military Staff
Czechoslovakia	Vojensko Sprava	Military Administration
East Germany	Wehrkreiskommando	Military Area Headquarters
Hungary	Megyei Kiegeszitoe Parancsnoksag	County Induction Center
Romania	Comisariatul Militar	Military Commissariat
Bulgaria	Okruzhie	Military Commissariat

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FIGURE 1. (U) COMMAND STRUCTURE OF NSWP COMMISSARIATS

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Department of the local Military District (MD).<sup>\*</sup> For purposes of daily routine and administration, however, control is exercised according to civil territorial subordination. Each commissariat is responsible to the commissariat at the next higher level. In NSWP countries the smallest territorial subdivision is the equivalent of the city ward or rural community. It is at this level, moreover, that most commissariats and related activities are found. The highest territorial level of most NSWP countries is the equivalent of the province or district. The exception is Czechoslovakia, which consists of two, nominally autonomous, republics.

(S) The number of territorial subdivisions in each NSWP country, however, is not necessarily a reflection of the total number of commissariats in that country. Demographic considerations play an important role in the creation of commissariats. In sparsely populated areas, for example, one commissariat may supervise more than one territorial subdivision. Because of lack of data, it is not possible to determine the total number of commissariats in each of the NSWP countries nor the number of personnel that staff them. For example, it is estimated that East Germany maintains some 14 regional-and 226 county-commissariats.<sup>\*\*</sup> These are manned by a total of nearly 5,500 military personnel (to include reservists) and 8,400 civilians. However, the number of commissariats serving the more than 7,600 East German urban/rural communities remains unknown.

#### b. Organization


(S) As in the USSR, the organization of NSWP commissariats is functional and reflects their basic missions. Commissariats normally have a command element and four departments. A fifth department responsible for premilitary training may also be standard in Czechoslovakia. In some of the other countries, at county level and above, separate departments are reported to exist for finance, security, and communications. The standard departments and their functions are shown in figure 2 and will be discussed in the next section of this study. Although little is known about the type of communications equipment and systems linking the commissariats with one another, alerts and field exercises in the NGA indicate communications are rapid and reliable. Linkage within the military net is not only with the local MD Headquarters but also with active units.

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\* (C) Although differing slightly from that in use in Romania and Bulgaria, to prevent confusion the term "military district" is used to designate the highest form of military, territorial subordination for all NSWP countries. In Romania the counterpart of the military district is called "territorial command"; in Bulgaria it is called "district military administration." Hungary has no such structure. Military administration in Hungary is exercised through defense commands at the county level.

\*\* (U) For a detailed look at the East German mobilization system see, USAREUR Intelligence Study: The East German Reserve and Mobilization System (U), EUR-1100-UISI-80, SECRET.

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**FIGURE 2. (U) ORGANIZATION OF COMMISSARIATS**

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(S) In the event of general mobilization, it is not clear to what extent NSWP commissariats would relocate to alternate locations. However, some hardened relocation sites for commissariats have reportedly been observed in East Germany. The special importance of Northern Tier countries to Pact military planners is also revealed by the fact that many Northern Tier commissariats are reported to have their own arms rooms and that some East German, Czech, and possibly also some Polish reserve officers with designated mobilization assignments keep their uniforms and some equipment at home.\* Both practices are unknown in the Soviet Union.

### 3. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(C) Of the numerous duties performed by commissariats as combined draft boards and reserve and veterans centers, the most important are those involving force generation. In peacetime this involves training youths and reservists; conscription; and managing the nations's reserve pool. In wartime it involves mobilizing reservists and transport assets from the civilian economy. These activities will now be examined in some detail.

#### a. Premilitary Training

(C) The scale of youth involvement in some form of military training in NSWP countries is enormous. Millions of youths are involved and training is both basic and specialized. Basic premilitary training is generally given in secondary schools and, as in the USSR (but with the curious exception of Bulgaria), is mandatory. In some countries, such training begins as early as ages 13-14, and takes the form of classroom instruction in such subjects as: military regulations, map reading, first aid, civil defense, and small arms instruction (often including firing at a local military installation). Such training, normally provided by reservists activated for that purpose by the commissariats, is probably a responsibility of the Conscription Department. Specialized training, on the other hand, is usually voluntary and provided by organizations often associated either with the armed forces or the Communist party.

(C) In East Germany, the only NSWP country with a tradition of premilitary training prior to World War II, specialized training is the responsibility of two mass groups: the Free German Youth (FDJ) and the Association for Sports and Technology (GST). The latter organization has a membership of approximately 500,000 youths. The number of East German males reaching draft age each year is only 29 percent of this total. Both organizations offer training in such skills as: radio, photography, aeronautics, parachuting, topography, civil defense, diving, driving, small arms firing, and squad-level tactics. In East Germany, the role of premilitary training has become increasingly important. In fact, East Germany is the only NSWP country with a premilitary training program as comprehensive and intensive as its Soviet counterpart, DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for the Cooperation of the Army, Air Force, and Navy).

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\*(C) Arms and equipment in one Czech commissariat included: 7.62-mm rifles, M58P assault weapons, pistols, R-109 type radios, Praga Y35 trucks, GAZ 69 jeeps, and CBR-related equipment.

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(C) If perhaps less systematic and well organized, premilitary training in the other NSWP countries is essentially the same as in East Germany. Poland has at least 10 organizations offering specialized premilitary training and appears to be the only country making membership in such organizations mandatory. One of the largest of these organizations is the Association of Scouts with a membership of 2.5 million youths. The number of Polish males reaching draft age each year is only 11 percent of this total. Of interest is development of premilitary training in that maverick nation of the Pact, Romania. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Romania had no uniform policy or program for training its youth. Since that time, Romanian leaders have established a nationwide training program to involve all youths. They have also let it be known, not always subtly, that the purpose for creating this additional source of trained manpower is to discourage intervention in Romanian affairs from whatever quarter.

(C) It is not the purpose of this study to examine the quality of premilitary training in NSWP countries. Although the quality and intensity of training undoubtedly varies from country to country, its existence has two salutary effects for all the countries: it provides an additional pool of manpower familiar enough with basic military skills to serve in some defense/support role if necessary; and it enables the armed forces to spend less time teaching such basic skills to conscripts. Table 4 identifies the most important premilitary training organization in each of the NSWP countries.

b. Reserve Training

(S) Upon completion of mandatory active duty, conscripts of all NSWP countries are automatically discharged into the reserves. There are, however, no special command structures of reserve forces in NSWP countries (or the USSR) similar to the US. Reserve units as Americans know them do not exist. In the event of mobilization, reservists would be activated individually either to bring active units to wartime strength, to replace battlefield casualties, or to create new units.

(C) By law, training and career monitoring of reservists are responsibilities shared by the Mobilization, and Officer/Enlisted Records Departments of the military commissariats. To enable control, all conscripts upon discharge are required to register with their local commissariat. Moreover, and as they occur, all changes of location, employment, family status, and other vital statistics must be reported to the commissariats. The length of reserve obligations in each of the NSWP countries are shown in table 5.

(C) Reserve training takes such forms as refresher courses and lectures conducted by the commissariats and local garrisons; alerts; active duty tours; and field exercises. Table 6 shows the legal provisions for reserve training in each of the NSWP countries. It is to be emphasized, however, that, as in the USSR, statutes regarding reserve training are considered enabling rather than mandatory. This is probably because of a Warsaw Pact-wide perception that the relatively large reserve pools that

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**Table 4**  
**Major Premilitary Training Organizations of NSWP Countries**

COUNTRY	ACRONYM	NAME	ENGLISH EQUIVALENT
GE CZ PL HU RO BU	GST SVAZARM ZHP MHSz UTC VTO	Gesellschaft fur Sport und Technik Svaz pro Spoluprace s Armadou Zwiazek Harcerzow Polskich Magyar Honvedelmi Szovetseg Gata pentru munca mi aparare Voenno-technicesko obucenie	Association for Sport and Technology Association for Cooperation with the Army Association of Polish Scouts Hungarian National Defense League For Work and Defense Military Technical Individual Training

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**Table 5**  
**Length of Obligation of Warsaw Pact Reservists (U)**

CATEGORY	GC	CZ	PL	HU	RO	BU
Officers	60	60	60	60	60	55-60*
Non-Commissioned Officers	50	50	50	55	60	55
Enlisted Men	50	50	50	55	50	55
* Depends on Grade Company Grade to — 55 Field Grade to — 60 Flag Rank to — 65						

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**Table 6**  
**Prescribed Tours of Active-Duty for Class I Reservists<sup>1</sup>**

CATEGORY	GC <sup>2</sup>	CZ	PL	HU	RO	BU
Officers Non-Commissioned Officers	3 months (total) and 3 months FTX 3 months (total) and 3 months FX	5 months (total) 4 months (total)	3 months (yearly) 3 months (yearly)	4 months (total) 3 months (total)	3 FTXS per year, each for 2 months For NCOs same as for Officers. For EM 3 months total.	3 FTXS up to 90 days each (total) Same as for Officers.
Comment	Usually 2-4 year lapse between FTX for individual re- servists.		Lesser skilled reservists are called up every 2-3 years	Reservists to participate in one FTX at least every 5 years.	Frequency is based on fear of in- vasion and/or sub- version.	Usually a 3 year lapse between all FTXs for reser- vists.

<sup>1</sup> In addition to such tours, reservists in each of the countries participate in alert exercises and may be called-up for short tours for weapons familiarization or other special training.

<sup>2</sup> The new East German Military Service Act which went into effect on 1 May 1982 eliminated reserve categories. Thus under the new law reservists may be called up regardless of age or grade. This, and the absence in the Act of provisions for deferment for study at schools of higher education, appear to be the only major changes created by the new law.

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exist in each country, as well as the accumulation into them each year of thousands of trained conscripts, provide a large enough base from which to draw adequately trained manpower. Consequently, reserve training in NSWP countries is neither as systematic nor as intensive as in the US. In most Pact countries, however, reservists with critical specialties, especially officers, are called up more frequently than other reservists.

(C) The data shown in table 6 pertain to Class I reservists. This is the group first to be called-up in the event of mobilization. Enlisted Class I reservists have usually completed mandatory service and are 35 years of age or under. Officer Class I reservists include all ranks ranging from 40 to 60 years of age.

c. Conscription

(C) Military service is compulsory in all NSWP countries. With the exception of Poland, males in these countries are drafted at age 18. In Poland the draft age is 19. The length of service for conscripts, by country and component, is shown in table 7. The regimes of all NSWP countries stress that military service is an honorable, even sacred, obligation and few males escape some form of service. Deferments are granted only in cases of extreme hardship (defined by law) or for purpose of attending an institution of higher education. Unless granted for permanent disability, however, all deferments are considered temporary, and mandatory service must be completed by a certain age, usually 27.

(C) As its name indicates, conscription is the function of the Second Department of the commissariats. The process is actually begun one year before induction, during the required and so-called "pre-induction registration." At this time, potential inductees are queried regarding their interests, given a physical examination, and encouraged to participate in premilitary training programs. Actual conscription in all countries is conducted semiannually. With one notable exception, induction procedures in NSWP countries are the same as those in the USSR. The exception concerns the assignment of conscripts. Normally, and whenever possible, inductees in NSWP countries are assigned to local units. In the USSR, on the other hand, conscripts and reservists often train with units in military districts other than those in which they reside. In the case of conscripts, especially, this often involves assignment to units in areas of the Soviet Union far removed from the conscript's home.

d. Mobilization

(C) Mobilization is probably the most crucial of commissariat functions. Over the years it has been practiced many times in all NSWP countries in the form of periodic alerts, training exercises, or actual, albeit partial, mobilization. Although mobilization procedures are virtually the same in all NSWP countries, data on performance is more readily available for those Pact countries in the NGA than elsewhere. Of the numerous reports and activities surveyed for this study, it can be stated that mobilization capabilities of Pact nations in the NGA are impressive and their systems highly efficient. Of course, in view of the envisioned role



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**Table 7**  
**Length of Obligatory Service for Conscripts (Months) (U)**

COUNTRY	GROUND FORCES	AIR FORCE	NAVY	FRONTIER
Bulgaria	24	24	36 <sup>1</sup>	—
Czechoslovakia	24	36	—	27
East Germany	18	18	36 <sup>1</sup>	—
Hungary	18	24	—	18
Poland	24	24	36 <sup>1</sup>	22 <sup>2</sup>
Romania	16	16	30 <sup>1</sup>	24

<sup>1</sup> For shipboard duty.  
<sup>2</sup> Territorial Defense Force (OT)

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of these Northern Tier states in any future war with NATO, and given their highly developed economies, this is not surprising. Indeed, because of the smaller manpower base to be managed and the generally higher technology with which it is done, it might even be argued that mobilization in the Pact Northern Tier states is more efficient than in the USSR. Computer technology, for example, appears to be far more prevalent in Northern Tier commissariats and military commands than in the Soviet Union. With the exception of Bulgaria, computer technology for mobilization is also used extensively in the other NSWP countries.

(S) Mobilization in all Pact countries is the ultimate responsibility of the Mobilization and Organization Directorate of the various General Staffs. The responsibilities and activities of these directorates include the following:

- Planning, directing, and coordinating all mobilization measures of the Ministry of Defense.
- Preparing schedules of the size, type, and composition of military units to be activated during mobilization.
- Preparing manpower quotas from the reserve base to flesh out activated units.
- Procuring and storing of mobilization supplies.
- Controlling and supervising of subordinate mobilization departments.

(C) Another important activity of the Mobilization and Organization Directorate is coordinating mobilization plans with the central economic planning agency and other government ministries. Given the highly centralized economies and rigid production quotas of Pact countries (with less stringency perhaps in Hungary and Romania), and the perennial manpower claims of the Armed Forces, this is an extremely important function. For this reason, peacetime military activities in Pact countries are usually so planned as to have a minimum impact on the respective economies. This is true of such activities as test alerts, reserve training, and military exercises. To this end also, certain occupational specialties and positions in all NSWP countries have been exempted from mobilization.

(C) The functions of the Mobilization and Organization Directorate of the General Staffs are performed at lower levels by the Mobilization and Organization Department of the Military District staffs, by the Mobilization Department of the local military commissariats, and by civilian enterprises. It is at these lower levels that relations between commissariats and military units become particularly active.

(S) Although a comparison of Soviet and Northern Tier mobilization procedures again reveals many similarities, there are, nevertheless, some areas that deserve close attention. To begin with, response time as a factor in mobilization planning appears to be especially critical in Northern Tier states. This is borne out by the following:

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-- In assigning reservists to units, Northern Tier countries (if not all NSWP countries) adhere strictly to the principle of territoriality. If a Northern Tier reservist relocates and his new unit has no need of his MOS, the reservist often will be trained in another MOS. He will not be sent to a unit that might need his old skills but which is considered to be "out of territory." Policy is to assign reservists to units as close to home as possible.

-- Mobilization designation assignments akin to those in the US exist for the Northern Tier nations.

-- Many reserve officers (and possibly NCOs) in mobilization assignments in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland reportedly keep uniforms and some equipment at home.

-- In the event of mobilization some reservists with critical skills would be notified and picked up at home by their units.

-- Units and their location are actually identified in the military service booklets of some East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak reservists (especially true of Poland).

-- In East Germany, assembly areas are selected so as to be no more than 20 kilometers away from the home of any reservist. It is also expected that reporting time to such areas will never be more than 2 hours. In addition, as appendix B shows, the missions of mobilized civilian transportation assets in Czechoslovakia and East Germany are limited to relatively short distances and therefore accomplished within minimum time. As with reserve personnel, the principle of territoriality is also employed in the use of civilian transportation assets.

-- In Czechoslovakia, unassigned reservists are expected to be readied by commissariats for transport to selected units, in uniform, no more than 4 hours after alert notification. Integration into units is to take place within 24 hours.

-- To accelerate notification and facilitate contact, alert notifications in East Germany are delivered by postmen and in Poland by local government personnel. Relieved of such chores, commissariats can expedite the actual processing and assignment of reporting reservists.

(S) Mobilization exercises appear to meet NSWP expectations on the whole. For example, during the Czech crisis in 1968, some Polish reservists from one military district were alerted, transported to a local airport, outfitted, armed, briefed, flown to Prague, and integrated into Polish units in less than 24 hours. Instances of Polish reservists integrated into mechanized cadre regiments within 12 hours have also been noted. Appendix A tabulates patterns of personnel dispersal during mobilization exercises held in East Germany from 1971 to 1979.

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(1) Manpower

(S) As previously stated, NSWP nations have no reserve units comparable to those in the US. In the event of mobilization, reservists in these countries would be mobilized individually to bring active units to wartime strength, replace battlefield casualties, or to create new units. Augmentation of standing units would be primarily in the ground forces. The relatively smaller naval, air, and air defense formations are in large measure at, or near, wartime strength. As indicated in table 8, the availability of reservists beyond those required to fill out standing forces is substantial and would support a wide range of force creation or replacement options. Moreover, as columns VII and VIII in the table show, a significant number of these reservists would have had some recent training. Owing to lack of data, however, the table is necessarily based on one, somewhat problematic assumption. It is assumed that reservists with the most recent training would be the first to be mobilized. While this is generally true, it is not invariably the case. According to a number of sources, during mobilization exercises reservists may be called up regardless of age or status of military training. This is especially true of reservists with professional skills, most notably doctors and engineers. Consequently, the percentages in column VIII are undoubtedly somewhat higher than shown.

(S) In exercising the force creation option referred to above, it is estimated that during the initial stages of war NSWP planners could create from their respective manpower pools--and within the limits of available equipment--the number of divisions shown in table 9.

(C) Another manpower resource available to NSWP planners are the militias that exist in all of these countries, except Bulgaria. The term "militia" should be understood to mean a force made up of volunteers, organized on a territorial principle, and directly under the control of the Communist party.\*

(U) Militias are actually the creatures of NSWP Communist parties and came into being for one of two closely related reasons. In some countries, they were created to enable the party to consolidate its power base in the aftermath of World War II. In other countries, they came into being years later to provide the party with an independent and reliable means for suppressing rebellion. For example, because of the poor support given it by the military during the revolution in 1956, the Hungarian Communist Party created its militia shortly after the USSR had crushed the uprising. It was also because of events in Hungary that Romania created its own militia at the time.

(S) The fighting quality of the various militias is difficult to assess. Little is known of the quality and effectiveness of the training they receive. However, militias do have their own uniforms, arms-

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\* (C) The one exception is Poland whose militia is under the immediate control of the Ministry of the Interior.

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Table 8  
Estimated Net Augmentation of Armed Forces from NSWP Reserve Pools in the Event of War/General Mobilization (U)

Country	I Active Forces (Peacetime)	II Reservists Trained Within Past 5 years	III Total Reserve Strength	IV Percent of Reser- vists Trained Within Past 5 years	V Estimated Wartime Augmentation	VI Percent of Reser- vists Required to Total Reserve Strength	VII Number of Re- maining Reser- vists Trained With- in Past 5 Years	VIII Percent of Reser- vists With Recent Training Available After Initial Wartime Augmen- tation to Total Re- serve Strength
GE	230,800	407,750	734,400	56%	76,500	10%	331,000	50%
CZ	212,200	280,000	1,500,000	19%	169,700	11%	110,300	8%
PL	369,000	500,000	2,064,500	24%	550,900	27%	0	0%
HU	120,500	127,500	985,000	13%	64,500	7%	63,000	7%
RO	216,550	500,000	1,300,000	39%	110,000	8%	390,000	33%
BU	162,130	204,500	721,000	28%	124,800	17%	79,700	13%
Total	1,311,800*	2,019,750*	7,304,900*	28%	1,096,400	15%	923,350	15%

\* Totals include paramilitary forces such as border and internal security troops.

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**Table 9**  
**NSWP Potential for Creating New Units (U)**

<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>Five infantry type divisions. These divisions would have fewer personnel and smaller equipment holdings than an MRD.</b>
<b>Czechoslovakia</b>	<b>Two MRDs</b>
<b>East Germany</b>	<b>One TD</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>Four divisions</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>No known force expansion plans</b>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>Two divisions</b>
	<b>No known force expansion plans</b>

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**Table 10**  
**Estimated Strength of NSWP Militias (U)**

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>ESTIMATED MINIMUM STRENGTH</b>
<b>East Germany</b>	<b>Workers' Militia</b>	<b>350,000</b>
<b>Czechoslovakia</b>	<b>Peoples' Militia</b>	<b>200,000</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>Workers' Militia</b>	<b>37,000</b>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>Patriotic Guard</b>	<b>250,000</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>People's Militia<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>350,000</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,187,000</b>
<sup>1</sup> Under immediate control of the Ministry of the Interior		

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and supply-systems, training facilities, and exercise areas. Their tactics and loyalty to party are currently exemplified in Poland where the militia has been extensively used to enforce martial law. Although their mission in wartime is heavily scenario dependent, their strength relative to the countries they represent, as shown in table 10, is indeed formidable.

(2) Materiel

(C) Supplying the armed forces with materiel, primarily transportation assets, is another responsibility of the mobilization department of NSWP commissariats. Although active units, even those at reduced strength, possess much of their combat equipment, in the event of war the ground forces, and to a lesser extent the air and naval arms, would require some augmentation of transport and engineer vehicles. Such assets will come from the civilian economy and will be used to augment divisional motor transport as well as to expand or create nondivisional combat and combat service support units. They will also become part of newly formed line units, or will be used to replace losses. Such vehicles include general purpose cargo trucks, tractors, cranes, graders, fuel- and water-trucks, buses, ambulances, passenger cars, and even taxis.

(C) In peacetime, these transportation assets belong to state enterprises, collective farms, and transportation conglomerates, and perform civilian tasks. However, certain of the vehicles and their drivers are selected by the commissariats and organized into motor transport units for mobilization in the event of war. These vehicles are maintained according to military specifications, are inspected yearly by personnel of the mobilization departments of the commissariats, given specific mobilization assignments, and usually manned in peacetime by reservists. In addition, the transport units undergo periodic alerts, often in conjunction with mobilization exercises. Deployment of vehicles, if involved, is usually to a field assembly point for the actual or simulated pickup of reservists; to a storage depot to practice loading and unloading supplies; or to an active unit. The condition of these vehicles is reported as ranging from poor to good. As in the Soviet Union, lack of spare parts, especially for the older vehicles, is a perennial complaint.

(C) Most of the information available about NSWP transport units concerns those in the Northern Tier Pact states. Analogous units are known to exist in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and procedures are believed to be similar. However, some notable differences between Northern Tier mobilization procedures of transport assets and those employed in the USSR have been observed:

-- To expedite mobilization, some reservist-drivers of mobilized vehicles keep their uniforms at home.

-- Some transport enterprises designated for mobilization have small supply- and arms-rooms for vehicle drivers. These rooms contain ammunition and automatic weapons.

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-- Unlike the USSR, during mobilization exercises drivers of mobilized vehicles frequently draw weapons and ammunition prior to deploying to assembly areas.

-- To accomplish their missions, transportation units drawn from civilian enterprises generally need travel only short distances. In East Germany and Poland, with exceptions to be sure, it is policy to limit such distances to 100 kilometers.

-- During alerts for mobilization exercises or partial mobilization, military and civilian police in East Germany have been known to establish road-blocks, stop private vehicles, transport their drivers to commissariats for mobilization, and impound the vehicles for military duty for the duration of the exercise. Although the potential for such procedures exists in the Soviet Union as well, so far as can be determined they have never been observed in that country.

(C) Appendix B tabulates dispersal patterns and missions of some 19 East German/Polish motor transport units over the past 12 years. Additional comments about motor transport units are provided in the appendix.



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4. CONCLUSIONS

(C) As in the USSR, military commissariats in NSWP countries play a crucial role in the system of force generation. Although patterned after those in the Soviet Union, there are, nevertheless, some procedural variations between Soviet and NSWP commissariats, especially in the Northern Tier states. Such variations are dictated both by geography and the strategic role to be played by NSWP countries in the event of war.

(S) Relative to the size and populations of the countries involved, the reserve forces at the command of NSWP commissariats are very substantial. NSWP nations have a total force of 7.3 million reservists. This is more than sufficient to raise the NSWP peacetime manning level from 1.3 million to an estimated wartime strength of 2.4 million. Obviously, and depending on scenario, it would enable NSWP planners to implement a broad range of force augmentation, replacement, and creation options. The principal constraint on the creation of new units would be materiel. Although data on total NSWP civilian vehicular assets is limited, available information suggests that they are more than sufficient to meet the mobilization requirements of NSWP planners, at least during the initial stages of war.

(S) The ability of the NSWP commissariats, especially those in the NGA, to mobilize reservists and transport assets has been well demonstrated in practice alerts and exercises and is judged as being both very rapid and efficient. Use of computer technology, highly developed telecommunications and lines of communications, and a specialized system for locating reservists, undoubtedly account for this. The capability for rapid and efficient mobilization is particularly crucial for the Northern Tier countries from which many of the initial assault forces would be drawn and through which enormous numbers of men and quantities of materiel would move in time of war.

(C) In spite of these positive features, however, there are some uncertainties regarding system performance as well. To begin with, the system has never been tested as a whole under conditions of modern warfare. Indeed, given the destructiveness of modern weapon systems, the ability of the commissariats to replace vast losses of manpower and themselves to survive must remain open to question. And for reasons already indicated, assets in NSWP nations would become particularly and extremely vulnerable to NATO strikes. Again, with the exception of those with designated mobilization assignments, NSWP reservists are not called up for training with any degree of consistency. Former reservists have also reported that even when called up, training has often been neither systematic nor intensive. Consequently, in the event of full mobilization, some expanded as well as new formations would need extensive training prior to commitment if high levels of combat effectiveness were seen as necessary. Finally, in any assessment of NSWP force generation capabilities and performance, the problem of Pact solidarity must at least be mentioned. There has been periodic unrest as well as violent uprisings in NSWP countries since World War II. Consequently, the stresses of a general European war and the accompanying threat--or actual employment--of nuclear strikes could limit the extent to which NSWP nations would carry out the extensive, and possibly

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protracted, mobilization of manpower and materiel integral to Warsaw Pact contingency planning.

(C) In conclusion, it may be stated that the strengths of the NSWP system of force generation are very impressive. However, the system possesses endemic weaknesses as well, which--when coupled with the problems, stresses, and demands of large mobilization and/or massive losses--could gravely affect mobilization performance.

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## Appendix A

Patterns of Personnel Dispersal  
During Mobilization Exercises  
in East Germany (U)

(S) The accompanying table is a collation of data from a sampling of numerous intelligence reports. Columns A, B, and C, respectively, indicate the type of activity and date; the military district in which participating organizations were located; and (as available) the approximate number of reservists mobilized. Column D identifies some of the participating organizations or assembly areas to which reservists reported and their locations. Column E shows two time categories: designated reporting time and approximate integration time. Designated reporting time indicates the time required for reservists to report from the location shown in column D to an initial operational site. These locations are usually shown as X-1. Approximate integration time indicates time to complete activities shown at location X-1, or subsequent operational sites; e.g., location X-2 or location X-3. Item 15, column F, shows two initial operational sites, X-1 and X-2. The average designated reporting time for the activities shown in the table is 3.4 hours. Approximate integration times are actual and are not based on averages. Columns F and G, respectively, identify the initial operational site and subsequent sites, as previously explained; and the distance from the location reported in column D to the initial operational site. Where applicable, and unless otherwise designated, distances shown are those between operational sites. Finally, column H indicates the length of time reservists remained mobilized. The following points are emphasized:

-- The participating organization may be an active unit or a commissariat. In those instances where commissariats are receiving organizations, the processing of reservists may be done at the commissariat by personnel of gaining units and deployment may be directly to the unit exercise area. As noted earlier, in the Pact Northern Tier states some reservists are picked up at home by their units.

-- So far as can be determined, transportation to initial operational sites is invariably accomplished by mobilized civilian transportation assets. On those occasions where distance between the participating organization and the operational site is particularly long, a combination of motor and rail transport may be employed.

-- Time factors, of course, are relative and scenario dependent. For example, the mobilization exercises shown in the table generally assume a situation in which the NSWP countries are either under attack or anticipate one and so minimum response time for mobilization is crucial. On the other hand, time as a factor might be of much less significance even during what might be termed a prolonged crisis. During such situations NSWP countries might choose to augment their forces incrementally and over longer periods than those indicated typically in exercises. The deployment of mobilized units and any postmobilization training required are, of course, among those additional factors that bear on a unit's availability for commitment.

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## PATTERNS OF PERSONNEL DISPERSAL DURING MOBILIZATION EXERCISES IN EAST GERMANY (U)

A Activity	B Military (Region/District) City	C Approx No. Reservists	D Participating Organization or Assembly Area	E Designated Reporting Time or Approx Integ Time	F Initial Operational Site	G Distance From Field Assembly Area	H Tour Length for Reservists
1. Mobilization Exercise June 1972	(Cottbus) COTTBUS (51 46N-14 20E)	?	U/I tank unit COTTBUS	1 + hours	U/I tank unit COTTBUS	—	3 days
2. Mobilization Exercise June 1972	(Luebben) RUHLAND (51 28N-13 52E)	?	Market square RUHLAND	4 hours	Unknown	—	3 days
3. Mobilization Exercise June 1972	(Luebben) UHYST (51 22N-14 31E)	?	Gasthaus in LOHSA (51 23N-14 24E)	5 hours	Unknown	—	?
4. Mobilization Exercise June 1972	(Frankfurt) FINOWFURT (52 51N-13 41E)	?	WKK EBERSWALDE (52 50N-13 50E)	6 hours	Unknown	—	?
5. Mobilization Exercise June 1972	(Magdeburg) HALBERSTADT (51 54N-11 03E)	?	Assembly area HALBERSTADT	3 hours	Unknown	—	2 days
6. Mobilization Exercise June 1972	(Karl-Marx-Stadt) KOTTENGRUEN (50 26N-12 17E)	?	Assembly area NEUSTADT (51 29N-14 27E)	5 hours	Unknown	—	3 days
7. Mobilization Exercise July 1974	(Dresden) DRESDEN (51 03N-13 45E) (First time construction equipment moved to Field Assembly Area by civilian firms and not reservists)	Numerous	WKK / Sports Stadium DRESDEN (51 03N-13 45E)	1 + hours 22(?) hours to form Engr Bn.	RIESA (51 18N-13 17E)	47 km NW	3 months (?)
8. Mobilization Exercise July 1971	(Dresden) DRESDEN (51 03N-13 45E)	2 U/I MR Divisions	Sports Stadium DRESDEN	Overnight warn- ing to report next day at 10:30 AM 12 + hours	X-1 GROSSERK MANNS- DORF. (Reception/ Screening center) (51 05N-13 56E) X-2 GROSSERK MANNS- DORF. (Uniform issue point) — 1000 meters from K-1 X-3 Training Exercise BAUTZEN (51 11N-14 26E)	15 km E  55 km NE	10 days
9. Mobilization Exercise August 1974	(Gera) GREIZ (50 39N-12 12E)	2,000+	High School GREIZ	Overnight warn- ing to report next day at 0600 hrs 10 hours	X-1 MOHLS DORF (50 40N-12 16E) (uniform and arms issue X-2 NOCHTEN (51 26N-14 36E) Training area	5 km NE  210 km NE	8 days
10. Mobilization Exercise August 1971	(Cottbus) KOTTMARSDORF (51 02N-14 38E)	Not stated	CUNEWALDE (51 06N-14 31E)	7 hours	GROSSDUBRAU (51 15N-14 28E) Clothing issue and exercise area	30 km NE	17 days

X-1 = Initial Operating Site (s)  
WKK / WBK = Military Commissariat

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A Activity	B Military (Region/District) City	C Approx No. Reservists	D Participating Organization or Assembly Area	E Designated Reporting Time or Approx Integ Time	F Initial Operational Site	G Distance From Field Assembly Area	H Tour Length for Reservists
11. Mobilization Exercise September 1974	(Dresden) DRESDEN (51 03N-13 04E)	Form new Engr Bn of 280 men	"Otto Grotewohl Hall" DRESDEN	1-4 hours 2-12 hours	X-1 "Otto Grotewohl Hall" DRESDEN X-2 u/i MRR RIESA (51 18N-13 17E)	—  47 km NW	6 months
12. Mobilization Exercise June 1978	(Neubrandenburg) SCHWERIN (53 38N-11 23E)	800	Apprentice School SCHWERIN	3 hours 13 hours	X-1 Agri Co-op PLATE (53 32N-11 29E) uniform issue X-2 u/i Kasern STERN-BUCHHOLZ (53 34N-11 27E)	15 km SE  25 km NW	14 days
13. Mobilization Exercise Fall 1975	PLAUEN (50 30N-12 08E)	at least 40	Banquet Hall PLAUEN	2 hours	X-1 WALDKIRCHEN (50 63N-12 22E) uniform issue X-2 u/i transport Bn DAENKRITZ (50 46N-12 25E)	25 km NE  55 km N	8 days
14. Mobilization Exercise 1974	(Leipzig) LEIPZIG (51 19N-12 20E)	Numerous	WKK (?) LEIPZIG	7 hours	EILENBURG (51 27N-12 37E)	23 km NE	4 weeks
15. Mobilization Exercise (Prueffeld) July 1971	(Leipzig) COTTBUS (51 45N-14 19E)	6,000	WBK COTTBUS	3 days instead of 24 hours  Not stated  Not stated	X-1(a) GUTTAU-67 MRR (51 16N-14 35E) uniform / arms issue X-1(b) RAUSCHWITZ 65 MRR(51 12N-14 08E) uniform / arms issue X-1(c) u/i 66 MRR X-2(a) NEUSTADT (51 29N-14 27E) 67th MRR maneuver area	65 km SE  70 km S From Cottbus  — 28 km N From Gutttau	4 weeks
16. Mobilization Exercise (4th MRD) September 1974	(Leipzig) LEIPZIG (51 19N-12 20E)	Numerous	WKK(?) LEIPZIG	2 hours 48 hours	IRFERSGRUEN (50 36N-12 26E) MOHLSDORF (50 40N-12 16E)	90 km S  85 km SW From Leipzig	12 days

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A Activity	B Military (Region/District) City	C Approx No. Reservists	D Participating Organization or Assembly Area	E Designated Reporting Time or Approx Integ Time	F Initial Operational Site	G Distance From Field Assembly Area	H Tour Length for Reservists
17. Mobilization Exercise August 1974	(Leipzig) KARL-MARX-STADT (50 50N-12 55E) GERA (50 52N-12 05E)	2,000 (at least)	(Karl-Marx-Stadt) GLAUCHAU (50 49N-12 32E) WILKAU-HASSLAU (50 40N-12 31E) GRIMMITSCHAU (NCA) THEUMA (51 02N-12 38E)  (Gera) GERA (50 52N-12 05E) GREIZ-POHLITZ (50 40N-12 13E)	1-10 hours	POEHL (50 33N-12 11E)  HOHENSTEIN-ERNSTTHAL (50 48N-12 43E) LENGENFELD (50 34N-12 22E) IRFERSGRUEN (50 37N-12 26E) WEISWASSER (51 31N-14 38E) WERDAU (50 44N-12 23E) ZWICKAU (50 44N-12 30E) ALTENHAIN (51 18N-12 42E)  All located in the Districts of Karl- Marxstadt and Gera	55 km	2-7 days
18. Mobilization Exercise April 1975	(Neubrandenburg) BRANDENBURG (52 24N-12 34E)	1,000-1,400	Three u/i areas in BRANDENBURG	1 hour (?) 1 hour	KLEIN- KREUTZ (52 26N-12 37E)	5 km NE	2 weeks
19. Mobilization Exercise Spring 1974	(Neubrandenburg) NEU-BRANDENBURG (53 33N-13 16E)	900-1,000	1. Sportsplatz 2. Puschkinplatz 3. Neustadter Markt (all in NEU- BRANDENBURG)	1 hour	X-1 KLEIN-KREUTZ (52 26N-12 37E) X-2 Area between WITTENBERG (51 52N-12 39E) and TORGAU (51 34N-13 00E)	175 km SW  65 km S  109 km SW	2 weeks

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## Appendix B

Dispersal Patterns of Some Mobilized East  
German and Polish Motor  
Transport Units (U)

(S) The accompanying table identifies 19 motor transport units by name, location, subordination, and mission. Acronyms and terms appearing in columns A and B are defined as follows:

<u>Acronym/Term</u>		
<u>German</u>	<u>Polish</u>	<u>English Equivalent</u>
VEB		People Owned Enterprise
Kraftverkehr		Motor Transport
Kombinat		Combine
Kraftverkehrsbetrieb		Motor Transport Company
	PKS	State Transportation Enterprise (County level)
	WPKS	State Transportation Enterprise (Provincial level)

(S) As columns D and E indicate, not all vehicle assets of an enterprise are designated for mobilization; however, and if necessary, they could be. Columns K and L show the primary mission of the transport units and the time within which such missions are to be accomplished. The times shown are believed average for the types of missions reported. Times indicated in column L, as applicable, may or may not include vehicle preparation time. Vehicle preparation time is that time needed to convert an average-size truck from civilian to military use. Procedures involved in East Germany and Czechoslovakia include: checking the lighting system; mounting two fuel canisters on the side of the vehicle; placing two supports inside the driver's cab to hold two carbines; affixing another support atop the cab to mount a machinegun; and painting military license numbers on the side of the cab and on the tailgate. Fuel tanks are routinely topped and first echelon maintenance is conducted daily. Finally, and unless otherwise stipulated, column M of the table indicates the distance traveled from the location shown in column C to the initial deployment site in column K. Columns L and M in combination indicate the distances traveled and times involved to accomplish the mission.

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## DISPERSAL PATTERNS OF SOME MOBILIZED EAST GERMAN AND POLISH MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS (U)

A Name	B Subordination	C Location	D Approximate No. of Autobase Vehicles	E Approximate No. of Mobilized Vehicles	F Condition of Mobilized Vehicles	G Problems	H Types of Vehicles	I Comments	J Frequency of Alerts	K Deploy To	L Time Limit	M Distance From Original Location	N Break Downs?	O DOI
1. VEB Ostsee-trans	?	STRALSUND (54 18N-13 06E)	?	70+	Not stated	None mentioned	10 buses 26 dump trucks 4 heavy loaders 8 pick-up vans 13 JELCZ lorries 10 motor cycles	At X-2 issued: Field uniform Field cap 7.62mm KALASHNIKOV Boots Blanket Steel helmet Gas Mask Webbing Equipment Exercise lasted 1 week.	Not stated	X-1 Sports Grounds STRALSUND (Pickup reservists) X-2 FRANZBURG (54 11N-12 53E) Uniform & arms issue X-3 BUCHHOLZ (NVA) Overnight halt X-4 GREIFSWALD (54 06N-13 23E) Exercise area	Not stated  1 1/2 hours  1 1/2 hours  Next day 3-3 1/2 hours	X-2 10 km SW of X-1  X-3 5 km SE of X-2  X-4 30 km SE of X-3	None reported	1974
2. VEB Kraftverkehr	?	LEIPZIG (51 20N-13 20E)	?	25	Not stated	None mentioned	H6 trucks S400 trucks CHEBEL trucks PHAENOMEN trucks	A total of 100 trucks were mobilized from the Leipzig area.	Not stated	X-1 VEB Kraftverkehr LEIPZIG (Pickup some reservists) (51 20N-13 20E) X-2 TORGAU (51 34N-13 00E) Support U/I Reserve Arty Regiment	2 hours  Not Stated	X-2 55 km NE of X-1	None reported	1969
3. VEB Kraftverkehr Kombinat	VEB Kraftverkehrs Kombinat DRESDEN	RIESA (51 18N-13 17E)	90-100 buses	40	Not stated	None mentioned	Not given	Trucks were driven to assembly area and given to NVA.	Not stated	X-1 ZEITHAIN (51 20N-13 20E) X-2 RIESA/CANITZ Airfield (51 19N-13 14E)	Not stated	X-1 6 km NE of RIESA	None reported	1977
4. VEB Kraftverkehr	?	ZWICKAU (50 43N-12 28E) (Load reservists)	100+	70	Poor to Fair	Fuel critical after Jan 1976	Section MB-1: 20 IFA W-50 trucks with 20 2-axle trailers. Of the 20 trucks, five were 1975 models and 15 were 1970 and 1971 models.  Section MB-2: 14 SKODA models between 1962 and 1972, and 6 MAZ models be- tween 1970 and 1972  Section MB-3: 20 IFA W-50 trucks, 1970 and 1971 models.  Section MB-4: 10 IFA W-50s of which 4 or 5 were 1976 models and the remaining five or six were 1974 and 1975 models; 7 MAZ 1974 and 1975 models, and 2 JELCZ 1976 models.	Exercise lasted 1 week.	Unknown	Vicinity of LEIPZIG (51 20N-12 22E)	Not stated	65 km N	None reported	1977
5. VEB Kraftverkehrs- betriebe	VEB Kraftverkehrs Kombinat KARL-MARX- STADT (50 50N-12 55E)	PLAUEN (50 30N-12 08E) (Load reservists)	400 trucks 50 buses	400 trucks 50 buses	Not stated	None mentioned	Not given	Exercise lasted 2 weeks.	Not stated	PAUSA (50 35N-11 59E)	Not stated	20 km NW	None reported	Sept 1974

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## DISPERSAL PATTERNS OF SOME MOBILIZED EAST GERMAN AND POLISH MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS

A Name	B Subordination	C Location	D Approximate No. of Autobase Vehicles	E Approximate No. of Mobilized Vehicles	F Condition of Mobilized Vehicles	G Problems	H Types of Vehicles	I Comments	J Frequency of Alerts	K Deploy To	L Time Limit	M Distance From Original Location	N Break Downs?	O DOI
6. State Transportation Enterprise (PKS)	PKS Central Depot WROCLAW (51 06N-17 02E)	SWIDNICA (50 50N-16 29E)	343	120 (trucks)	Apparently good	Excessive drinking in general among Polish drivers	STAR-28, 29, 200 JELCZ 315, 316 ZILs IFAs	Uniforms, helmets, gas masks, back-pack, boots, entrenching tool issued at Autobase.	Six to eight times yearly	Autobase, then to BOLKO-CASERN for weapons. Then to training area between MODUSZOW (50 47N-16 23E) and ZLOTY LAS (50 46N-16 23E)	In 1973, during an alert at which officers from WROCLAW acted as observers, the enterprise was commended for the short preparation time until departure. Alert was called at 1400 hours and at 0200 hours in the morning, all vehicles and drivers were ready to depart (three groups with 30 trucks each were involved).	6 km SW 8 km SW	None reported	1976
7. State Transportation Enterprise (PKS)	PKS KATOWICE (50 14 N-18 59E)	GLIWICE (50 17N-18 40E)	180	180	Poor	Spare parts and pilfering of parts	80 buses 100 trucks (combination of STAR and JELCZ vehicles). Only 60% of vehicles were operable most times.	Uniforms kept at home; gear at Autobase.	Once yearly	Assembly area near STANCE (50 42N-20 29E)	Ready to deploy in 3 hours	18 km SW	Many break downs	1975
8. State Transportation Enterprise (PKS)	Hqtrs KOSZALIN (54 11N-16 11E)	KOLOBRZEG (54 11N-15 35E)	71	33	Good	Lack of spare parts	ZILs 130, 133, 130G STAR-25 JELCZ trucks	Approximately 20% of non-mobilized vehicles constantly deadlined.	Not stated	U/I (8th MRD?) MR unit at KOSZALIN (54 12N-16 11E)	Under 4 hours to Autobase	44 km SE	None reported	1974
9. State Transportation Enterprise (PKS)	?	OKSZTYN (53 47N-20 29E)	200	30	Best vehicles mobilized	None mentioned	STAR-21, 29 NYSA-501	All vehicles carry a large first aid kit and a complete set of maintenance tools. At the beginning of an alert, mobilization vehicles also load a kit containing a pick, a shovel, an axe, a saw, tire chains, and a towing chain, but they do not carry a spare parts kit.	Not stated	Autobase, then to POL Depot in MARCIANKOWO (53 41N-20 40E). Off load POL drums at distribution point in GUTKOWO (53 48N-20 24E)	Between 4-6 hours	17 km SE 40 km NW	None reported	1970
10. Provincial Transportation Enterprise (WPKS)	Central Office SZCZECIN (53 26N-14 36E)	GRYFICE (53 54N-15 12E)	280	100	Poor	Shortage of spare parts	70-IFA trucks 20 u/I trucks 5 STAR-25 5 STAR-28	Drivers were reservists who had uniform and packs at home.	2-3 times yearly	U/I Military Installation 3 km SE of TRZEBIATOW (54 04N-15 16E)	Not stated	19 km NE	None stated	1973
11. KOHOLZ	Central Koholz OPOLE (50 39N-17 56E)	KLUCZBORK (50 59N-18 13E)	60	60	Apparently good	None mentioned	50-STAR 28, 29 7 GAZ-51 3 JELCZ	All vehicles had to be topped with enough gasoline at all times to travel 600 km.	Not stated	U/I Military unit in BRZEG (50 51N-17 28E)	Report to unit in less than 7 hours	89 km SW	None stated	1976
12. State Transportation Enterprise (PKS)	District Hqtrs TORUN (53 00N-18 36E)	GRUDZIADZ (53 29N-18 45E)	210	210	Apparently good	None mentioned	50 JELCZ buses — 51-seat capacity plus driver 14 SANOS buses — 56-seat capacity plus driver 16 AUTOSAN buses — 51-seat capacity plus driver 100 SAN buses — 48-seat capacity plus driver 30 Polish Czech-made trailers with a 32-seat capacity NOTE: The JELCZ and SAN buses were Polish models, the SANOS a Yugoslavian model, and the AUTOSAN was a Polish/Czech model on a SKOT frame.	All vehicles to be radio-equipped beginning in 1976. All of the reservists stored their equipment at home, except for helmets and weapons. When alerted they put their uniforms on and took their entire equipment with them, so that by the time they reached the motor pool they were completely dressed. Soon after their arrival, they were equipped with weapons, and broken down into squads and platoons. Each reservist received a PMK weapon, six magazines of five ammunition line magazine was then inserted in the weapon). Weapons came from the weapons depot within the motor pool.	Every three months	Exercises held in an area known as "RUDNIK", which was about 6 km S of GRUDZIADZ. This area was about 20 hectares in size and was a military restricted zone. This area served as an assembly area for reservists and the PPA units from GRUDZIADZ, SWIECIE, CHELMNO and BRODNICA. A number of buildings served as control centers for the exercises. Within the buildings, military equipment was stored.	Ready to deploy in 2 hours	6 km S	None reported	1976

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## DISPERSAL PATTERNS OF SOME MOBILIZED EAST GERMAN AND POLISH MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS

A Name	B Subordination	C Location	D Approximate No. of Autobase Vehicles	E Approximate No. of Mobilized Vehicles	F Condition of Mobilized Vehicles	G Problems	H Types of Vehicles	I Comments	J Frequency of Alerts	K Deploy To	L Time Limit	M Distance From Original Location	N Break Downs?	O DOI
13. Transportation Enterprise	?	GDYNIA (54 32N-01 82E)	200	200	Not stated	None mentioned	STAR trucks	Uniform kept at home. Sorry painted numbers. Loaded fire hoses, u/i metal pipes, and fuel canisters from nearby warehouse	Not stated	Assembly area at POLCZYNO (54 35N-01 82E)	?	35 km NW	None	1979
14. Construction Transport Enterprise	Main Transport KATOWICE (50 14N-19 01E)	RACIBORZ (50 05N-18 13E)	180	180	Good	None mentioned	3 ZUK 4x2 box-body trucks 25 ZIL 130 4x2 platform trucks 20 ZIL 130 4x2 dump trucks 40 MAZ 500A 4x2 dump trucks 15 JELCZ 315 4x2 dump trucks 3 JELCZ 315 4x2 platform trucks 14 JELCZ 315 4x2 semi tractors 5 MAZ 500A 4x2 semi tractors 20 JELCZ 316 6x4 platform trucks 6 STEYER 6x4 platform trucks 22 STEYER 6x4 dump trucks 1 JELCZ 591 4x2 tank truck semi-trailer 6 STAR 29 4x2 trucks with benches, capacity 34 persons. TOTAL 180 vehicles In Dec 78 the ZIL 130 4x2 platform trucks and dump trucks were exchanged for KAMAZ trucks.	ZIL 130 4x2 dump trucks were equipped with rocket launchers.	Not stated	Either: U/I unit in PRUDNIK (50 19N-17 34E) Or: POL depot in BORONOW (50 40N-18 56E)	?	85 km NW  112 km SE	Not stated	1978
15. Opole Public Transportation Authority (PKS OPOLE)	?	OPOLE (50 41N-17 57E)	500	500	Fair	Shortage of spare parts, especially tires and batteries	200 SKODA buses 150 STAR 66s, JELCZs 150 MAZ 66s, 63s, ZILs 131s, MAZ 200 tractors YAZ, SKODA, JELCZ trailers	PPS and PPSH submachine guns, helmets and masks stored in arms room at Autobase. One full round of ammo per weapon also stored. Ropes and camouflage paint also stored. Uniforms kept in homes.	Three times yearly	U/I unit in OPOLE or Ammo storage Depot 1 km S of JASTRZEBIE (51 01N-17 45E) (Loaded ammo on trucks and then unloaded)	2 hours for 100 trucks to load ammo	53 km NW	None (POL trucks accompanied columns)	1979
16. City Taxi Enterprise	?	POZNAN (52 24N-16 55E)	1,000	1,000	Good	None reported	300-NYSA Taxis 300-"SZUKI" taxis 400-JELCZ trucks	70% of drivers were reservists who kept their uniforms and equipment at home.	Not stated	Various U/I assembly points in POZNAN	Not stated	N/A	Not stated	1978
17. Transportation Enterprise (PKS)	PKS Admin Office KATOWICE (50 14N-19 01E)	BYTOM (50 20N-18 54E) LAGIEWNIKI (50 19N-18 54E)	240	80	Only vehicles less than 3 years old are mobilized	Shortage of spare parts, especially tires	SKODA dump trucks STAR 128 STAR 210 JELCZ 412 ZUKS 11 13s Uniforms and MA3 52 submachine guns issued reservists at autobase.	Approx 100 vehicles were usually declined because of shortage of spare parts	Once every 2-3 years	From Autobase to wooded area N of TARNOWSKIE GORY (50 27N-18 52E)	3 hours	60 km NW	None reported	1979
18. Motor Transport Enterprise	?	GLIWICE (50 17N-18 40E)	236	236	Not stated	None mentioned	130 JELCZ 54-seater buses for regular bus routes 5 JELCZ 81 trucks 2 JELCZ 161 trucks 93 STAR 25/28/29 trucks 3 STAR 7,200 litre tanker trucks 1 small bus 1 Volvo car 1 Fiat car All vehicles at the depot had a mobilization task.	Reservists were issued uniforms and equipment at Autobase. Each of the drivers had a set of complete military equipment consisting of: field uniform one field cap, steel helmet, a woolen cap (covering head and neck), one pair of brown calf-length combat boots, a short warm overcoat, two undershirts, two pairs of shorts, one warm under shirt, one pair of long under-pants, one gsm suit, two pairs of socks, foot-wraps, mess kit, field pack, and CBR equipment, consisting of protective suit, protective mask, and gloves. The equipment was kept in numbered bags and stored in one of the company's supply rooms.	Once to twice yearly	On mobilization, the HQ of the newly-mustered transport regiment would be in GLIWICE. The echelon areas of the 3 constituent battalions of the regiment would be located as follows: 1st Battalion (PKS-GLIWICE) along forest road CA 212998 CB 208033 2nd Battalion (PKS-RYBNIK) along forest road CB 208033 - CB 245014 3rd Battalion (PKS-MYSZKOW) along forest road CB 245014 - CA 212998 Autokolona to report to supply Depot in KRAPKOWICE, load supplies and equipment for cadre regiment and report to areas above.	Lapse of 12-24 hours from alert assembly area KRAPKOWICE (50 29N-17 58E)	N/A  25 km SW  68 km SW	None reported	1979
19. TRANSMAG Transport Enterprise	Ministry of Mining KATOWICE (50 14N-18 59E)	ZABRZE (50 18N-18 47E)	165+	165+	Good	None mentioned	Together with the vehicles on location at its branches, the enterprise in ZABRZE had a total of about 300 vehicles. In ZABRZE, the enterprise had the following vehicles: 40 STAR H-28, diesel engine, 5 ton-trucks, 25 STAR H-29, 5 ton-trucks, 13 JELCZ 8 ton-trucks, 17 JELCZ, two-way dump trucks, 5 JELCZ, 10 ton-trucks, 25 two-axle trailers, 10 ton, manufactured in GDR, 12 STAR buses, 32-seaters, and 29 JELCZ buses, 54-seaters.	In lieu of frequent alerts, drivers participated in reserve training each year for 1-3 months.	Infrequent	The Enterprise's military equipment was stored at its branch in GLIWICE-SOSNICA. In the event of general or partial mobilization drivers were to report to GLIWICE-SOSNICA and draw uniforms, gas masks, entrenching tools, sitting benches, tarpaulin, and two gasoline containers (each twenty liters) per vehicle. Drivers of STAR H-28 (5 ton) trucks were expected to transport approximately 32 reservists each. Only after drawing this equipment were missions to be announced.	Not stated	45 km SE	None reported	1978

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A024 DEF NUCLEAR AGCY  
A132 OASD ISA/EASIA&PAC (2)  
A136 OASD ISA/IRATP  
A138 OASD ISP/EUR-NATO  
A310 JCS/J-3 (SP OP DIV)  
A353 JSTPS (2)  
A363 USNMR SHAPE  
A368 USRMC/NATO  
A704 SLO IZMIR  
A706 JLO NAPLES

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B004 DIA/DI-1  
B017 DIA/DI-6  
B040 DIA/DIO  
B054 DIA/DI-AA  
B055 DIA/DI-AB  
B060 DIA/RTS-2A5 PLNT  
B068 DIA/DI-AC  
B080 DIA/SNS  
B100 DIA/IR  
B134 DIA/DR-2  
B155 DIA/RTS-2A4 PP  
B160 DIA/DI-1B  
B168 DIA/DI-2C  
B322 DIA/ISI-7A  
B351 DIA/RTS-2A4  
B361 DIA/DR-1B1A  
B362 DIA/DR-1B1  
B363 DIA/DR-1B1B  
B364 DIA/DR-1B1C  
B368 DIA/DR-1B5  
B542 DIA/DR-415  
B545 DIA/VP  
B548 DIA/VP-A1

B565 DIA/DR-1F1 (15)  
B566 DIA/DR-1F2 (2)  
B571 DIA/DR-4G1  
B574 DIA/DR-4G5  
B579 DIA/JSI-2B  
B580 DIA/DR-1B3  
B581 DIA/DR-1B  
B582 DIA/DR-1C  
B584 DIA/DR-1B2 (3)  
B586 DIA/DR-4D1  
B591 DIA/HI-5 (2)  
B592 DIA/DR-1C2  
B593 DIA/DR-1E  
B594 DIA/DR-1F  
B597 DIA/DR-1G1  
B601 DIA/DR-11A  
B609 DIA/DR-4E4  
B632 DIA/DR-4G2  
B640 DIA/ISW-1  
B649 DIA/DR-4F2  
B681 DIA/DR-6C AHS  
B737 DIA/RTS-2B (LIB) (5)  
B779 DIA/JSI-2D  
B782 DIA/DR-1C3  
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C090 TFCOM/BETO  
C202 111 CORPS  
C210 USA SOLD SHIP CTR  
C227 101ST AIRBORNE DIV  
C231 2ND ARM DIV  
C234 1ST CAV DIV  
C235 1ST INF DIV  
C241 FIRST US ARMY  
C242 FORSCOM  
C243 FIFTH US ARMY  
C245 OPPOSINGFORCINGDET  
C246 6TH CAV BDE (AC)  
C286 417TH MID

C289 423RD MID (STRAT)  
C305 18TH ABN CORPS  
C306 82ND ABN DIV  
C309 500TH MIG  
C348 453D MID  
C351 10TH SFG(ABN)1STSF  
C412 CISIGSEC SPRN PSF  
C414 4TH INF DIV  
C415 5TH INF DIV (M)  
C417 7TH INF DIV  
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C428 OP TEST&EVAL AGCY  
C459 COMD-GEN STF COL  
C461 INFANTRY SCH  
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C562 TRANS SCH  
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H526 HQ 3RD INF DIV  
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H529 HQ 3RD ARMORED DIV  
H530 HQ 1ST ARMORED DIV

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L156 381 SMW/DO221  
L157 384 AREFW/DOXI  
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